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Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools-The
American Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause
Introduction
The First Amendment guarantees in part that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion."' This restriction is ex-
tended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Responding to the
potential for establishment clause violations in public schools, the United
States Supreme Court has gradually developed standards for evaluating
establishment clause challenges in this area.'
In Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools,4 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that invocations and bene-
dictions5 at high school graduation ceremonies were not per se unconsti-
tutional.' Under the Sixth Circuit's ruling, such benedictions and
invocations are valid if they "preserve the principle of equal liberty of
conscience" 7 and do not "go beyond 'the American civil religion.' "8
This holding presents an ominous interpretation of the current Supreme
Court mandate on establishment clause questions.
This Comment examines Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools as a
new step in the continuing evolution of establishment clause jurispru-
dence. Part I presents both the traditional approach of Lemon v. Kurtz-
I. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
3. See, eg., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down an Alabama statute
authorizing a moment of silence in all public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(striking down a state statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in each public
classroom in the state); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding un-
constitutional a requirement that the Bible be read or the Lord's prayer be recited in a state's
public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating the requirement that an
official state prayer be recited in the public schools of the state).
4. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'g 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
5. An "invocation" is "a form of prayer invoking God's presence, said [especially] at the
beginning of a public ceremony." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 749 (1966). A "benediction" is defined as "the form of blessing pronounced by an
officiating minister, as at the close of divine service." Id. at 138.
6. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
7. Equal liberty of conscience is limited by interests of the public in order and security.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
8. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
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man9 and the singular "historical practice" approach of Marsh v.
Chambers."0 Part II discusses the application of these two approaches in
the decisions of the district and appellate courts in Stein. Part III ex-
plores the use of the "American civil religion" concept" and the rela-
tionship between that concept and the historical practice test. Finally,
Part IV of this Comment considers the difficulties that arise in adopting
the American civil religion as an exception to the Establishment Clause.
This Comment contends that the Sixth Circuit articulated a rule in
Stein that the Supreme Court had followed but never clarified: in cases
involving ceremonial invocations and benedictions, courts should regard
the American civil religion concept as constitutionally valid and use the
Marsh historical practice test1 2 rather than the Lemon test.
Two secondary conclusions follow. First, it seems likely that the
Supreme Court has avoided addressing the American civil religion idea
to forestall constitutional objections to "establishment" of a state religion
by that name. Second, while the Sixth Circuit accurately perceived the
implied support of civil religion by the Supreme Court, judicial use of the
"civil religion" concept to distinguish valid from invalid state-supported
religious expression would seriously weaken establishment clause protec-
tion of persons who do not share the beliefs underlying American civil
religion.
I. The Two Supreme Court Approaches to the
Establishment Clause
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman 3
At issue in Lemon were two state statutes providing financial aid to
nonpublic schools. The Court found both statutes unconstitutional be-
cause they involved excessive entanglement between government and
religion.14 Integrating criteria it had developed in earlier cases,"5 the
Court in Lemon laid down a three-part test for evaluating government
action under the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
11. "American civil religion" refers to an underlying set of non-creedal beliefs and values
held by the members of our society. See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text. Sociologist
Robert Bellah introduced the term into contemporary discussion. Note, Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L. J. 1237, 1247-48 (1986).
12. This is the term used hereinafter to refer to the test enunciated in Marsh.' This test is
also referred to as the "acknowledgment exception." See Note, supra note 11, at 1245.
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Id. at 625.
15. For a concise summary of the development of the Lemon test, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Legislative Prayer and the Establishment Clause: An Exception to the Traditional Analy-
sis-Marsh v. Chambers, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 157 (1983).
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion .... ""
In the period between 1971 and 1983, the Lemon test became the stan-
dard in establishment clause cases.
17
B. Marsh v. Chambers'"
In Marsh v. Chambers, a state congressman challenged the Ne-
braska legislature's practice of opening each legislative day with prayer
by a state-paid chaplain.' 9 By a six to three vote in Marsh 20 the Supreme
Court departed from its previous reliance on the Lemon test in establish-
ment clause cases.2 ' The Court instead applied a historical test based on
the alleged original intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights.22
The district court had held that while the prayers themselves did not
violate the Establishment Clause, paying the chaplain with public funds
did.2 3 However, the Eighth Circuit, applying the Lemon test,24 held that
Nebraska's practice violated all three parts of the test: the purpose and
primary effect of the practice was to promote a particular religious ex-
pression, and use of state money to compensate the chaplain and publish
the prayers led to impermissible entanglement.2 5
The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Burger, began its discus-
sion of Marsh with a review of the American tradition of opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer.26 As an example, the Court pointed out that
Congress authorized the appointment of a paid chaplain only three days
16. 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
17. Examples of cases in which the Supreme Court utilized the Lemon test include Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Public
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
18. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
19. Id. at 786.
20. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in which Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Mar-
shall. Id. at 1030 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented. Id. at 1047 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
21. This departure has evoked sharp criticism. See Note, supra note 15, at 176-85, for the
proposition that by developing an alternative to the Lemon test, the Court in Marsh created an
unwarranted exception to the Establishment Clause.
22. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788-91.
23. Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 592 (D.C. Neb. 1980).
24. The district court did not mention the Lemon test. It defined the restriction placed on
the states by the First Amendment as follows: "[T]he clause forbids a legislature from making
any law that tends to firm up or support religion or to prefer one branch of religion or one
religious belief over another." Id. at 588.
25. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982).
26. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. Chief Justice Burger traced this development from colonial
times. He gave as an example Virginia's policy of opening legislative sessions with prayer, both
during and after the existence of its state religion. Id. at 787 n.5.
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before final agreement on the language of the Bill of Rights was
reached.27 Discussing the weight that should be given to this history,
the Court stated:
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contempo-
rary violations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more
here than simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evi-
dence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Es-
tablishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the practice [of appointing paid chaplains] au-
thorized by the First Congress- their actions reveal their intent.2"
Chief Justice Burger related this early congressional practice to that
of the Nebraska legislature, stating that it would be "incongruous" to
interpret the Establishment Clause as imposing greater restrictions on
the states than its drafters imposed on the federal government.29 The
Court's view of prayer under the circumstances in question was an indul-
gent one: for a legislative body to invoke divine guidance is not an estab-
lishment of religion, "it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs
widely held among the people of this country."30 The Court concluded
that the challenged practices did not violate the Establishment Clause.3"
II. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools: Application of the
Two Methods of Analysis
A. The Factual Background
The plaintiffs in Stein were parents of students who were about to
graduate from the two schools in question. The parents sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent the school districts from permitting invoca-
tions and benedictions at commencement ceremonies in their districts.
3 2
The facts in Stein were not in dispute. Plainwell High School and
Portage Central High School, two public schools in western Michigan,
regularly included benedictions and invocations in their commencement
ceremonies.33 These ceremonies were held outdoors during the evening,
27. Id. at 788.
28. Id. at 790. See generally Chesler, Imagery of Community, Ideology of Authority: The
Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 457 (1983) (discussion
of a recurring tendency of former Chief Justice Burger to allow moral reasoning to decide
constitutional issues).
29. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91.
30. Id. at 792.
31. Id. at 795. The Court upheld the state's practice despite noting that (1) for 16 years
the legislature had selected a clergyman of only one denomination; (2) the legislature paid the
chaplain with public funds; and (3) the prayers were in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Id. at
793.
32. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F. Supp. 43, 44 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
33. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1407 (6th Cir. 1987). Benedic-
tions and invocations are the actual terms used by the court. See supra note 5.
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and conferral of a diploma was not contingent on a student's attend-
ance. 4 The invocations and benedictions at Plainwell High were deliv-
ered by two student volunteers, who also determined their content.35 At
Portage Central High, the graduating seniors had traditionally organized
the commencement ceremonies. For at least fifteen years, students had
selected local Christian clergymen to deliver an invocation and
benediction.36
B. The District Court's Analysis
The district court applied the Lemon test in Stein,37 first determin-
ing whether the school districts were motivated by a secular purpose in
including the invocations and benedictions.38 In the court's view, even if
the graduation speaker had a purely religious purpose, the practice was
constitutional as long as the school administration had a primarily secu-
lar purpose.39 It found that the defendant school districts had two such
possible purposes: first, to follow an established tradition; and second, to
allow students to be involved in either planning or participating in the
graduation exercises. 4' Furthermore, the court found no evidence of a
secret religious purpose.41
The district court next determined that the proposed benedictions
and invocations would not have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion.42 The court based its conclusion on six factors: (1) the ceremony
was not a mandatory part of the curriculum;43 (2) speakers other than
school employees delivered the prayers, whose content was not subject to
school control;' (3) the one-time ceremony raised no danger of daily
34. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407.
35. Id. The Plainwell High invocation given in June 1985 made reference to "Heavenly
Father", "God", and "Divine Master." Id. at 1407 n.1.
36. Id. at 1407. The May 1985 invocation at Portage Central High, delivered by a Lu-
theran minister, included a reference to "Christ our Lord." Id. at 1407 n.2.
37. 610 F. Supp. at 47-50.
38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. The court cited the Supreme Court's holding in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
271-73 (1981), that a student group's religious purpose did not negate a university's secular
purpose in providing that group with equal access to meeting room facilities.
40. Stein, 610 F. Supp. at 48. At Plainwell High School, where the students themselves
delivered the invocation and benediction, the school administration required them to practice
before the speech instructor but did not monitor the content. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 48. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57-61 (1985), for an example of religous
purpose.
42. 610 F. Supp. at 48-49.
43. Id. See also Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (voluntariness of participation in graduation ceremony is an important factor
in evaluating propriety of state action).
44. 610 F. Supp. at 48-49. Contra Graham v. Central Community School Dist., 608 F.
Supp. 531, 532-33 (D.C. Iowa 1985) (school board's inclusion of invocation and benediction
Spring 1988]
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indoctrination;45 (4) the audience was composed mainly of adults rather
than impressionable children;46 (5) the graduation ceremonies were not
part of the educational programs of the schools; 47 and (6) there was no
evidence that the speakers intended to use the opportunity to
proselytize.48
Finally, the court determined that the benedictions and invocations
would not foster excessive entanglement of government with religion. 9
The decisive factors here were the infrequent nature of the graduation
ceremonies and the fact that only minimal contacts existed between
school officials and local clergy. ° Thus, the district court's holding that
the school districts' practices were acceptable under the Establishment
Clause was based on an intensely fact-specific analysis.5
C. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit subjected the case to a rather different
analysis. The court phrased the issue on appeal: "what kind of invoca-
tions and benedictions, if any, does the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment permit the public schools to conduct at their annual com-
mencement exercises?" 52 In answering this question, the Sixth Circuit
declined to apply the Lemon test.53 It explained that the commencement
ceremonies in question were "analogous to the legislative and judicial
sessions referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same princi-
ples."5 4 The court interpreted Marsh as standing for the proposition that
violated the Establishment Clause even though the speaker was not a school employee and the
board had no control over content).
45. 610 F. Supp. at 49. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (posting of Ten
Commandments in classroom served purpose of "inducing the schoolchildren to read, medi-
tate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey the Commandments").
46. 610 F. Supp. at 48-49. Cf. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Grand Rapids School Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1407 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub. nom Grand Rapids
School Dist. v. Ball, 465 U.S. 1064 (1985) (noting a special concern because the challenged
program primarily affected children).
47. 610 F. Supp. at 49-50. See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Va.
1974) (noting the common practice of using invocations in legislatures and at celebrations of
public holidays).
48. 610 F. Supp. at 50. Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (content of
prayer unimportant in legislative setting since there was no attempt to proselytize).
49. 610 F. Supp. at 50.
50. Id. At Portage High School, where a member of the clergy delivered the invocation
and benediction, neither the school administration nor the senior class representatives
previewed the content of the presentations. Id. at 45.
51. Id. at 50. It therefore denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and later dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claim on the merits. See Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d
1406, 1408 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'g 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
52. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407. See infra text accompanying note 78 for a discussion of the
dissent's disagreement with this framing of the issue.
53. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1408-09.
54. Id. at 1409.
ceremonial invocations and benedictions are acceptable under the Estab-
lishment Clause if they do not "go beyond 'the American civil reli-
gion' "I' and provided that they preserve "the substance of the principle
of equal liberty of conscience.""
The court discerned in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
the "guiding principle" of "equal liberty of conscience.""7 The court
viewed this principle as a means of accommodating the vast spectrum of
religions in American society:
In our national and community life, we can never be sure
whether our particular religious, sectarian and moral convictions
will be in the majority or the minority. So as a diverse people we
have rejected the notion of a confessional state that supports reli-
gion in favor of a neutral state designed to foster the most extensive
liberty of conscience compatible with a similar or equal liberty for
others.5s
Equal liberty of conscience, though described by the court as the
"guiding principle"5 9 in the court's analysis, is limited "by the common
interest in public order and security."60 The court noted that the
Supreme Court had concluded in Marsh that individuals may be required
to make some accommodation with our national history and tradition.61
The Supreme Court's deference to the tradition of ceremonial prayer in
legislative, judicial, and other public circumstances suggests that the
facts of Stein lay on the "boundary between liberty of conscience and
public order and tradition."' 62 Although the court failed to draw the
boundary, it seemed to conclude that the Stein plaintiffs did not enjoy an
absolute right to be free from the school districts' implicit endorsement
of the beliefs conveyed in the challenged invocations and benedictions. If
the ceremonies merely reflected American civil religion, the plaintiffs' lib-
erty of conscience would give way to the state's interest in "public order
and tradition" that such civil religion represented. 63 Thus, the Marsh
limitations on the principle of equal liberty of conscience would require
the court to permit the tradition of invocations at graduations to con-
tinue if the content of the prayers did not "go beyond the 'American civil
55. Id. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text, describing the concept of "Ameri-
can civil religion."
56. 822 F.2d at 1409.




61. Id. Marsh referred to the tradition of opening legislatures and other public delibera-
tive bodies with prayer. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
62. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1408-09. The Sixth Circuit observed that it is the job of the federal
courts to draw such boundaries. Id. at 1409.
63. Id. at 1409.
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religion.' "6
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's deference to the
historical basis of allowing prayer at public ceremonies suggests that the
ceremonial nature of graduation was the key to the court's decision to
rely on the historical practice test of Marsh.65 Had the court viewed
Stein as a traditional school prayer case, it probably would have felt obli-
gated to use the Lemon test.66
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the decreased opportu-
nity for impermissible religious indoctrination in ceremonial situations as
compared with classroom prayer.67 According to the court, several char-
64. Id.
65. The Sixth Circuit did not necessarily have to find that the facts of Stein paralleled
those of Marsh. In a similiar case decided two years earlier, a district court within the Sixth
Circuit had held that inclusion of an invocation and benediction in a public high school gradu-
ation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause. Graham v. Central Community School
Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. Iowa 1985). The district court considered and rejected the
Marsh test, stating:
The Marsh decision is a singular Establishment Clause decision that rests on the
"unique history" of legislative prayer, and the holding of that case is clearly limited
to the legislative setting. Any doubts about the limited application of Marsh and the
continued viability of the Lemon three-part test were laid to rest by the Court's post-
Marsh application of the Lemon three-part test in Lynch. This court is abundantly
satisfied that it must measure the facts of this case by the Lemon three-part test.
Id. at 535.
During the same month in which the Sixth Circuit announced its decision in Stein, a
California court of appeal considering the constitutionality of including invocations at high
school graduation ceremonies arrived at the same result reached in Graham. In Bennett v.
Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal held the practice unconstitutional under both the United States and Cali-
fornia Constitutions. Id. at 1016. The court discussed the unique history of legislative prayer
and distinguished Marsh as being limited to its facts. Id. at 1022, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
Bennett interpreted the Marsh Court's holding as an acknowledgment that legislative invoca-
tions are not intended "to inject religion into a state function, but to honor those persons who
founded this country by continuing a practice specifically established by them." Id. The Cali-
fornia court held that graduation invocations are clearly distinguishable in that, because public
schools did not yet exist in this country, the Founding Fathers made no provision for them.
Id. at 1023.
66. In a case decided only a few weeks before Stein, the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute requiring the teaching of "creation-science." Edwards v. Aguillard,
107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). Affirming the applicability of the Lemon test, the Court stated:
The Lemon test has been applied to all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in
Marsh v. Chambers... where the Court held that the Nebraska legislature's practice
of opening a session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical
acceptance of the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining
the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public education was
virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Id. at 2577 n.4 (citations omitted). For an illustration of the continuing importance of the
Lemon test, compare the separate opinions in Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985): Justice
Powell's concurrence, id. at 62; Justice O'Connor's concurrence, id. at 67; and Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent, id. at 91.
67. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
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acteristics of the graduation ceremonies made the invocations and bene-
dictions noncoercive: the public nature of the ceremonies, the presence of
parents and other adults, and the absence of a potentially intimidating
student-teacher classroom setting.
68
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Marsh historical practice
test applied,69 the Sixth Circuit held that the school invocations and
benedictions violated the Establishment Clause.7' The court viewed the
actual language in the invocations and benedictions as symbolic govern-
mental endorsement of the Christian religion, since they employed "the
language of Christian theology and prayer."71 Going "beyond the Amer-
ican civil religion," these practices did not constitute the type of nonde-
nominational or "civil" prayers approved in Marsh.72
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Although Judge Milburn concurred with the result in Stein, he ana-
lyzed the case differently.73 He stated briefly that ceremonial school
commencement prayer should satisfy both the Marsh and Lemon stan-
dards.74 In his view, "most, if not all, of the challenged prayers" did not
meet the Lemon test.
75
Judge Wellford dissented from the conclusion reached by the major-
ity and the concurrence while acquiescing in much of their analysis.76
He felt that the majority had erred in framing the issue in terms which
emphasized the content of the prayers.77 According to Wellford, the is-
sue presented in Stein was "whether any invocation or benediction at a
public high school commencement in the form of a prayer, or reference
to the Deity, the content of which prayer is not officially prescribed, is
constitutionally permissible.",
7 1
Wellford reviewed several Supreme Court cases involving religion in
the public schools 79 and noted that the Court had consistently concerned
itself with "(1) regularly scheduled or persistent religious expressions, (2)
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1409-10.
70. Id. at 1410.
71. The court focused on the ceremony's employment "of Christian theology" by invok-
ing "the name of Jesus as the Savior." Id See also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
72. Id. See also Note, supra note 11, at 1256, for suggestions of acceptable civil prayers.
73. 822 F.2d at 1410 (Milburn, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 822 F.2d at 1410 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1411-12 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1412 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1412-15 (Wellford, J., dissenting). Judge Wellford cited Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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in a classroom setting, (3) officially sponsored or sanctioned content initi-
ated by school authorities, which are (4) directed to students, primarily
those of formative years."" ° Judge Wellford contended that the Supreme
Court had consistently found a first amendment violation when a major-
ity of these factors was present.8 1 Since none of these factors was present
in Stein, 2 Judge Wellford concluded that the invocations and benedic-
tions were constitutional.
III. The "American Civil Religion" Concept
In its establishment clause analysis, the Sixth Circuit mentioned the
sociological concept of "American civil religion." This concept, in the
court's view, circumscribed the proper limits of ceremonial invocations
and benedictions.83 As examples of American civil religion the court
spoke of secularized invocations used to open formal sessions of various
public bodies across this country.84 The court did not, however, define
this term. Instead, the court referred generally to a commentator's dis-
cussion of civil religion." The commentator summarized two scholarly
views of "civil religion."86
One view, expressed in very broad terms, perceives civil religion as a
set of beliefs and attitudes held generally by the people of any given polit-
ical society. These beliefs, expressed in public rituals, myths, and sym-
bols, explain the meaning and purpose of that society in terms of its
relationship to a transcendent, spiritual reality.87
According to the commentator, three salient elements characterize
all civil religions. First, civil religion is a modem phenomenon, existing
as part of society's response to the modem world.88 Second, the focus of
civil religion is political, i.e., the transcendent features of its rituals,
myths, and symbols are all tied to the political life of the society. 9 "A
civil religion gathers and expresses the most deeply felt, abiding ideals
and attitudes of a society's political life. By drawing on the form and
language of sacral religion it achieves a special resonance and power." 90
80. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1414 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1414-15 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1415 (Wellford, J., dissenting). Judge Wellford described the invocations and
benedictions in Stein as a brief acknowledgment of religion in a yearly ceremony outside the
classroom, involving children beyond the formative years. Id.
83. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
84. Id. These public bodies included legislatures, city councils, and courts.
85. Instead, the court cited Note, supra note 11, as "an excellent discussion of civil reli-
gion as a concept." 822 F.2d at 1409 n.5.
86. Note, supra note 11, at 1247-49.
87. Id. at 1249.
88. Id. at 1249-50. The author uses the term "modernity" to refer to the post-Reforma-
tion, industrialized Western world. Id. at 1249.
89. Id. at 1250-51.
90. Id.
Third, as an underlying set of beliefs binding together persons of different
creeds, civil religion does not represent any particular sect or group of
tenets or doctrines.91
The other scholarly view focuses on American civil religion in par-
ticular and perceives it as "a sort of millenarian Protestantism that had
been secularized and assimilated into American culture, eventually tak-
ing the form of a comprehensive set of values, symbols, rituals and meta-
physical assumptions, all centered around and rooted in the
interpretation of the American historical experience." 92
American civil religion, in the view of the commentator cited by the
Sixth Circuit, has evolved to fill the gap left by the constitutional ban on
official state religions.93 Historically rooted in the religious beliefs of the
early American colonists, American civil religion follows the forms and
structures of Judeo-Christianity, and particularly of Protestantism.94
Five themes characterize American civil religion in particular:
[First,] a sense that there is some sort of transcendent princi-
ple of morality to which this polity is, or ought to be, reponsible;
[second,] a faith in democracy as a way of life for all people and a
concommitant belief in an American mission to spread it the world
over; [third,] a sense of civic piety, that exercising the responsibili-
ties of citizenship is somehow a good end in itself; [fourth,] a rever-
ence for American religious folkways; and [fifth,] a belief that
Destiny has great things in store for the American people.
95
In Stein the Sixth Circuit drew upon this view of American civil
religion to give a specific name to what the Supreme Court had alluded to
in Marsh. The Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged the concept of an
"American civil religion" when it described the use of prayer in opening
sessions of various public bodies as "deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country" 96 and as having "coexisted with the principles
of disestablishment and religious freedom" since colonial times.
97
Furthermore, the Court's refusal to use the Lemon test in circum-
stances involving such historical traditions may reflect the fact that the
Lemon test simply does not work in the civil religion context.9 8 A test
for secular "purpose" and "effect" is unmanageable so long as the courts
lack a precise and practical definition of "civil religion" which relates it
.91. Id. at 1250.
92. Id. at 1248. This description was drawn from the theories of sociologist Robert N.
Bellah.
93. Id. at 1251.
94. Id. See also id. at 1254 n.84, for a discussion of the existence of Judeo-Christianity.
95. Id. at 1252 (footnotes omitted).
96. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
97. Id.
98. See Note, supra note 11, at 1243-44.
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to the Lemon concept of secularity.9 9 Under the conventional analysis of
Lemon, unless American civil religion is "secular", promotion of this
religion would be a religious purpose and would result in the advance-
ment of a particular religion.1' Yet the Court in Marsh implicitly ap-
proved this type of quasi-political religious expression when it bypassed
the Lemon test in favor of a "historical practice" framework.''
A. Lynch v. Donnelly: Can Lemon and Marsh Be Reconciled?
The Court's reasoning in Lynch v. Donnelly 102 further supports the
possibility that a historical practice test may replace the Lemon test for
establishment clause cases implicating an unofficial American civil reli-
gion. Lynch involved a municipally owned Christmas display in a park
in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. The display included several traditional,
secular Christmas images 10 3 as well as a Nativity scene. Plaintiffs chal-
lenged Pawtucket's sponsorship of the creche as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause."°
The district court applied the Lemon test and found that the inclu-
sion of the creche in the Christmas display was unconstitutional.0 5 A
divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 106 The
Supreme Court reversed, 07 and stated at the outset that total separation
of church and state was impossible to achieve, and in any case not consti-
tutionally mandated.' The Court concluded that "the Constitution...
affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all reli-
gions, and forbids hostility toward any."'0 9
The Court also traced the history of official recognition of religion in
America, citing as examples the approval by the first Congress of the
employment of a paid chaplain, use of the motto "In God We Trust" on
American currency, and inclusion of the language "One nation under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. ° This history furnished the rationale
for the Court's consistent refusal "to take a rigid, absolutist view of the
Establishment Clause. We have refused 'to construe the Religion
99. See id. at 1252.
100. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
101. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 1028.
102. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
103. Id. at 671. These images included a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's
sleigh, a Christmas tree, and a large banner reading "SEASONS GREETINGS." Id.
104. Id.
105. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp 1150, 1178 (D.R.I. 1981).
106. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982). Unable to find a secular purpose
for the inclusion of the creche, the Court did not reach the other two prongs of the Lemon test.
Id. at 1035.
107. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672.
108. Id. at 672.
109. Id. at 673.
110. Id. at 674-76.
[Vol. 15:533
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate constitu-
tional objective as illuminated by history.' """i
In Lynch, the Court observed that every judicial inquiry in an es-
tablishment clause case calls for line-drawing; no fixed rule can be ap-
plied.112 Although the Lemon test was described as a useful tool in the
line-drawing process,113 the Court explicitly disavowed strict allegiance
to that test. 1 14 Nonetheless, the Lynch Court proceeded to utilize Lemon
in its analysis. Both Lynch and Marsh thus seem to acknowledge tacitly
the existence of an American civil religion and endorse the concept that
state promotion of this religion is valid under the Establishment Clause.
Lynch clearly stressed that the historical test was a proper alternative to
Lemon under some circumstances. However, the Court's failure to define
the historical test precisely, and its ultimate use of Lemon to decide the
issue before it, left open the key question of what factors trigger applica-
tion of a historical practice test instead of Lemon.
IV. Problems With The Historical Practice Test, as
Interpreted by Stein
In Stein, the Sixth Circuit cited equal liberty of conscience and
American civil religion as standards for determining whether ceremonial
invocations and benedictions are constitutional under Marsh.115 Use of
the concept of American civil religion as a test for constitutionality, how-
ever, poses serious problems, not the least of which is the vagueness of
the term itself. If, as has been suggested,11 6 courts look to scholarly writ-
ings on the subject, they will have to decide among different scholars'
perceptions of a historical and cultural phenomenon that is by definition
subject to constant change and reinterpretation. 17 This approach would
lead to judicial legislation at its worst. Consistency in this area of great
constitutional importance demands a more precise analytical standard
than can be provided by the concept of American civil religion.
A more fundamental problem arises when American civil religion is
exempted from the establishment clause bar on government support of
religion. This exemption violates the Establishment Clause insofar as the
civil religion includes specific religious elements imposed by the majority
on dissenting minorities. Proponents of this exemption argue that Amer-
11. Id. at 678 (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)).
112. Id. at 678.
113. Id. at 679.
114. Id. The Court stated: "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. See also id. at 687
(O'Connor, J., concurring) and id. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.), for further discussion of the Lemon test.
115. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987).
116. Note, supra note 11, at 1255.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 84-99.
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ican civil religion is something accepted by all members of our society.11
However, while the beliefs of American civil religion may not be directly
derived from particular creeds, they clearly bear the marks of religious
tenets-particularly those of Protestant Christianity.1 9 These tenets are
offensive to an increasing number of religious minorities. As America's
religious and cultural diversity continues to expand, many Americans
who do not subscribe to civil religion or to the narrow political assump-
tions it represents, may perceive the link between the divine and specific
policy choices as impermissable governmental or majoritarian indoctri-
nation. Examples of such policy choices range from requiring public
school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance to justifications for for-
eign military intervention. Government protection of American civil
religion amounts to the establishment of a religion these citizens do not
share.
Finally, the Court stated in Lemon that "political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect."' 120 Recognition of American civil
religion as an exception to the establishment clause ban on government-
endorsed religion would create the very kind of political division the
Court feared.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Marsh developed a historical practice test
without explicitly recognizing American civil religion, apparently to
avoid the appearance of establishing a "state" religion. The historical
practice test escapes the establishment clause problem by emphasizing
historical views of constitutionally acceptable state conduct.
Stein's importance lies in its astute interpretation of the Supreme
Court's historical practice test. The Sixth Circuit perceived the Supreme
Court's decision in Marsh as based on "American civil religion," and
articulated a rule that the Supreme Court had only implied: in cases
involving certain public ceremonies and rituals, including prayers and
references to particular religious beliefs or assumptions, courts should
regard American civil religion as an essentially secular phenomenon, and
use the more deferential Marsh historical practice test rather than the
Lemon test.
The decision in Stein is, of course, controlling only in the Sixth Cir-
cuit. Should other circuits accept its interpretation of Marsh, more
plaintiffs will find it difficult to halt government involvement in religious
activities when those activities are judicially acknowledged as expressions
of American civil religion. This may mean, in turn, that a significant
118. Note, supra note 11, at 1254-55.
119. Id. at 1251.
120. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
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segment of the American population will be subjected to state religious
activities it finds personally offensive. The current emphasis on the his-
torical practice thus threatens to de-emphasize the significance of the
views of religious minorities in this country.
By Linn Van Meter-Drew*
* B.A., Magna cum laude, California State University, Fresno, 1980; M.M., Western
Michigan University, 1984; Member, second year class. The author dedicates this Comment
to the memory of her father, Richard L. Van Meter, M.D.
Spring 19881 ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

